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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2008) 
and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
L Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to classify the medical 
practice as Dr. Keiter's separate property. Because this is a question of law, the standard 
of review is correctness. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887. 
IL Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the 
Snow Basin Property acquired by the John E. Keiter MD PC Defined Benefit Pension 
Plan prior to the parties' marriage, was marital property to be divided equally. The 
standard of appellate review for property distribution in a divorce action is abuse of 
discretion. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,^8, 176 P.3d 476. 
A. Whether the Snow Basin Property lost its separate character when it 
was distributed to Dr. Keiter as an individual from his separate defined benefit 
retirement plan. Legal conclusions concerning the nature of property are reviewed 
under a standard of correctness. Id.\\\. 
B. Whether the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings on all 
material issues, which is reversible error. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, % 16, 176 
P.3d476. 
C. Whether Ms. Keiter carried her burden of proof to show, after the 
initial categorization of the Snow Basin Property as marital or separate, that it then 
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became marital property. Because this is a question of law, the standard of review 
is correctness. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887. 
D. Whether the Snow Basin Property retained its separate character 
during the marriage. The standard of review for factual findings is clearly 
erroneous. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, % 9, 176 P.3d 476. But the standard of 
review for conclusions as to the legal effect of facts is correctness. Bradford, 1999 
UT App 373, H 10, 993 P.2d 887. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules that are 
determinative of these issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves an unlawful and inappropriate property distribution in a divorce 
proceeding whereby a husband was deprived of his separate premarital property absent a 
finding of commingling of funds, enhancement by the spouse, or some equitable need. 
Prior to its order on distribution, the trial court miscategorized a fifty-acre piece of 
developable real property ("the Snow Basin Property") as marital instead of separate and 
failed to categorize at all a medical professional corporation belonging solely to the 
husband. Thus, despite the husband's acquisition of certain property before his marriage 
and his concerted and obvious efforts to keep that property separate from the marital 
estate during marriage, the trial court awarded the wife a one-half interest in the Snow 
Basin Property. Further, although specifically requested to do so, the trial court refused to 
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enter a finding that Dr. Keiter's medical practice was his separate property. In its effort to 
achieve equitable distribution, the trial court misapplied the law governing the division of 
a marital estate. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial 
Appellant John E. Keiter ("Husband") appeals the trial court's final award and 
division of the marital estate as ordered by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Summit County, State of Utah, on September 4, 2008. (R. 633-35). Appellee Dana Keiter 
("Wife") filed for divorce on October 14, 2004 on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. (R. 1-10). Husband filed an Answer on December 6, 2004. (R. 35-41). 
Following a three-day bench trial before the Honorable Judge Bruce C. Lubeck on 
December 12-14, 2007, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on December 
24, 2007. (R. 484-530). Prior to the final entry of the Decree of Divorce on February 22, 
2008 (R. 562-68), Husband filed a Motion to Amend and/or Alter Findings of Fact and 
Judgment. (R. 531-40). The trial court denied Husband's Motion in its Order dated 
September 4, 2008. (R. 633-35). Husband timely filed a Notice of Appeal on September 
9, 2008. (R. 636-37). 
III. Relevant Facts 
Dr. and Ms. Keiter married on February 6, 1982 and separated in July 2004. (R. 
487). Ms. Keiter filed a petition for divorce on October 14, 2004. (R. 1-10). The marital 
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estate totals more than five million dollars without the inclusion of the Snow Basin 
Property, discussed below. (R. 488b).1 
Ms. Keiter is in her early fifties and has a bachelor's degree in theater arts. (R. 
487). She also pursued a master's degree in the same field, which is completed except for 
her thesis. (R. 487). Most recently, Ms. Keiter worked in her chosen field as an artistic 
director for a theater, earning $2,688 gross per month, but she voluntarily ended her 
employment in May 2007. (R. 488). Dr. Keiter is nearly seventy and has worked as a 
plastic surgeon for more than thirty years. (R. 488). He started his medical practice in 
Ogden in 1974, more than seven years before his marriage to Ms. Keiter. (R. 488). 
During the entire course of their marriage, Dr. and Ms. Keiter each maintained 
separate, personal bank accounts. (R. 502). Additionally, Dr. Keiter maintained separate 
accounts for his medical practice and his retirement plan. (R. 493, 501-02). Dr. Keiter 
made monthly deposits of $620 from his medical practice to Ms. Keiter's account, which 
she held solely in her name. (R. 502). Neither party was a signatory on the other's 
accounts at any time before or during the marriage. (R. 639:148, 640:434). 
A. Medical practice and retirement plans 
Dr. Keiter started his medical practice in Ogden, Utah in 1974, joining with Dr. 
Berjera under the name Plastic Surgery Associates. (R. 488, 489). Even though Dr. Keiter 
eventually opened a new office in Salt Lake City (R. 639:149), his practice remained the 
same during and after his marriage to Ms. Keiter. (R. 640:425). Ms. Keiter never worked 
1
 One page of the Memorandum Decision was overlooked and left blank when the record 
was filed and numbered. Thus, the page occurring after 488 but before 489 is herein 
referred to as 488b. 
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for Dr. Keiter's medical practice on a full or part-time basis during their marriage. (R. 
640:426, 639:150). Nor did Ms. Keiter contribute to or enhance the practice's 
development, maintenance, or growth. The extent of Ms. Keiter's involvement was 
shopping for and hanging a few pieces of artwork for the office. (R. 640:377, 423). Even 
that involvement was minimal because Dr. Keiter hired an outside interior designer. (R. 
639:150). Ms. Keiter never worked as Dr. Keiter's receptionist, assistant, or bookkeeper. 
(R. 639:150-153). Any work that she performed was done either before the parties' 
marriage or on an emergency basis and she was adequately paid for her work. (R. 
640:421,426). 
The income from Dr. Keiter's medical practice was kept in a business account 
separate from any marital funds. (R. 502). Ms. Keiter only received benefits from the 
medical practice through a biweekly salary of about $310 deposited into her separate 
personal account, which she used to pay for food and household bills. (R. 502). 
Additionally, Dr. Keiter paid for Ms. Keiter's credit cards during the marriage. (R. 502). 
In 1972, Dr. Keiter's partner, Dr. Berjera, started a profit sharing plan known as 
Plastic Surgery Associates PC Profit Sharing Plan. (R. 489). Although the plan was 
established before Dr. Keiter entered the medical practice, Dr. Keiter began participating 
in and contributing to this retirement plan on June 15, 1974. (R. 490). Each doctor made 
his own separate and distinct retirement contributions. (R. 489). 
The assets that Dr. Keiter had in Plastic Surgery Associates PC Profit Sharing Plan 
were later rolled into the John E. Keiter MD PC Defined Benefit Pension Plan, which 
was created in 1980 (the defined benefit plan). (R. 490). Dr. Keiter served as trustee of 
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this defined benefit plan. (R. 491). Dr. Keiter entered the marriage on February 6, 1982 
with the defined benefit plan in place. The defined benefit plan was valued at $187,000 
and had been awarded to him individually in January 1982 pursuant to his first divorce. 
(R. 494, 507). 
Prior to Dr. Keiter5s marriage to Ms. Keiter, the defined benefit plan purchased as 
one of its assets the Snow Basin Property, located in Huntsville, Utah. (R. 491). The 
property, which consisted of eighty total acres, was purchased jointly with Summerhawks 
LTD, a partnership owned by Dr. Clarke Summers. (R. 491). The two entities purchased 
the Snow Basin Property for a total price of $480,000, with the purchase agreement being 
signed in September 1981. (R. 491). According to an oral agreement with Dr. Summers, 
Dr. Keiter's retirement plan was to retain fifty acres and pay five-eighths of the purchase 
price, and Dr. Summers' retirement plan was to retain thirty acres and pay three-eighths 
of the purchase price. (R. 491). 
On March 31, 1994, due to an "over funding" problem, the defined benefit plan 
was terminated on the advice of Dr. Keiter's counsel and changed to the John Edward 
Keiter MD PC Profit Sharing Plan (the profit sharing plan). (R. 499-500). Accordingly, 
all the assets in the defined benefit plan except for the Snow Basin Property were rolled 
over into the profit sharing plan. (R. 499). This amount totaled $1,005,886. (R. 499). Ms. 
Keiter was not a named participant in either the defined benefit plan or the profit sharing 
plan. (R. 500). 
Even though the parties stipulated to the equal division of profits (if any) from the 
medical practice upon Dr. Keiter's retirement or liquidation of the practice, Dr. Keiter 
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never stipulated that the practice is or was marital property. (R. 509). Indeed the evidence 
shows that the medical practice was and is Dr. Keiter's separate property because he 
acquired it seven years before marrying Ms. Keiter. (R. 489). 
B. Snow Basin Property 
The trial court found that Dr. Keiter, as trustee of his defined benefit plan, 
purchased the Snow Basin Property in 1981, a year before his marriage to Ms. Keiter. (R. 
491). The Snow Basin Property, although originally held by Dr. Keiter's defined benefit 
pension plan, was distributed to Dr. Keiter individually in 1994 when his defined benefit 
plan was changed to a profit sharing plan. (R. 500, 499). With the exception of the Snow 
Basin Property, all of the assets contained in the defined benefit plan were rolled over 
into the profit sharing plan. (R. 501). Dr. Keiter paid no consideration at the time he 
received the property individually, although he did have to pay an early withdrawal 
penalty and associated income tax. (R. 501, 504). The income tax was paid from Dr. 
Keiter's separate, personal account, which the trial court erroneously found to be marital 
property. (R. 504). Although Dr. Keiter had various options available (i.e., titling the 
Snow Basin Property in joint names, a family partnership or trust, all as discussed with 
his counsel), he chose to take title individually, and title to the Snow Basin Property has 
remained solely in Dr. Keiter's name since 1994 when he received it. (R. 500, 639:183-
86). While the trial court assumed that the titling of the Snow Basin Property exclusively 
in Dr. Keiter's name was done solely for tax purposes (R. 515), in truth, Dr. Keiter never 
transferred title to Ms. Keiter in spite of ample opportunities to do so during their twenty-
five year marriage. (R. 500). 
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The Snow Basin Property consists of 49.86 acres of raw land near the Snow Basin 
ski resort in Weber County. (R. 488b). The land is wooded and mountainous, but has not 
yet been developed. (R. 488b). Dr. Keiter made the majority of payments on the Snow 
Basin Property before his marriage to Ms. Keiter. (R. 639:189). In fact, the trial court 
recognized the dearth of any evidence demonstrating that Dr. Keiter paid off the Snow 
Basin Property during the marriage. (R. 513-14). Although Dr. Keiter made a couple of 
final payments on the Snow Basin Property after his marriage to Ms. Keiter, the funds 
used came from either his separate, personal medical practice account or from his 
individual retirement plan. (R. 496). 
Ms. Keiter was never enthusiastic about or interested in the Snow Basin Property 
during the marriage. (R. 508). Yet, according to testimony from Ms. Keiter, Dr. Keiter 
has always been passionate about the Snow Basin Property. (R. 640:455). Dr. Keiter 
visited the Snow Basin Property hundreds of times while Ms. Keiter's visits were much 
less frequent. R. 639:197, 640:454-55. In fact, Dr. Keiter spent many of his days off work 
improving the Snow Basin Property. (R. 640:428). Only modest improvements in the 
amount of $158,640 were made during the marriage (R. 508, 538), but any and all 
improvements were funded through Dr. Keiter's personal accounts. (R. 508). Likewise, 
property tax payments, totaling about $43,000 during the marriage, came from Dr. 
Keiter's personal account. (R. 508). Ms. Keiter testified that she had done nothing to 
enhance the Snow Basin Property through her own funds or efforts. (R. 640:458-59). 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision found the Snow Basin Property to be 
marital and subject to equal division, stating that it lost its premarital character when it 
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was distributed from the defined benefit plan and transferred to Dr. Keiter individually. 
(R. 493, 514-15). This finding was made in spite of the fact that Ms. Keiter did not carry 
or discharge her burden to prove either that she contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property or that the property lost its separate identity 
through commingling. (R. 640:458-59). 
In its findings of fact, the trial court noted that the Snow Basin Property taxes were 
paid out of Respondent's separate personal account. (R. 501). Yet, the principal basis on 
which the trial court found commingling of the Snow Basin Property was that the parties 
paid the property taxes with marital funds. (R. 515). The court also averred commingling 
because the parties "discussed" the Snow Basin Property (R. 515). 
The trial court valued the Snow Basin Property at $2,390,000 based on a 
September 2006 appraisal. (R. 528). While the trial court gave the parties discretion on 
how to maximize the property's value and share it equally, it did order—in the case an 
agreement is not reached—that the property be sold by the end of 2009, with the proceeds 
to be divided equally. (R. 529). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to classify Dr. Keiter's 
medical practice as his premarital and/or separate property regardless of any stipulation 
governing the conditional distribution of assets from that separate property. Additionally, 
the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the Snow Basin Property is 
marital property to be divided equally between the parties. The Snow Basin Property was 
Dr. Keiter's separate property, and Ms. Keiter did not meet her burden of showing that 
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there was any type of commingling, enhancement, or equity which required that she be 
awarded any interest in Dr. Keiter's separate property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY NOT 
FINDING THAT DR. KEITER'S MEDICAL PRACTICE WAS HIS 
SEPARATE PROPERTY 
In distributing property in divorce proceedings, "trial courts are first required to 
properly categorize the parties' property as marital or separate," which was not done for 
Dr. Keiter's medical practice. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, If 18, 45 P.3d 176. This 
categorization, while seemingly unnecessary where the parties have already stipulated to 
the division of a particular piece of property, is critical because "each party is presumed 
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property." Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ^  15 190 P.3d 497 (quoting Bradford v. 
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, \ 26, 993 P.2d 887). The failure to classify property has the 
potential to work a manifest injustice. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^ J 38, 
147 P.3d 464 (finding failure to classify certain figurines as husband's separate property 
did not work a manifest injustice because husband was awarded the property at issue). 
Anything that a person acquires before marriage is separate property. Rappleye v. 
Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting the general rule that 
"premarital property is considered separate property"). Under Utah law, the only way that 
separate property loses its identity and becomes marital is if 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring 
an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
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identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring 
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse. 
Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, % 20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Thus, premarital property remains separate 
unless the non-owning spouse enhances the property or the property becomes 
commingled with and in the marital estate. 
In this case, the trial court failed to enter any finding or conclusion regarding the 
nature of Dr. Keiter's medical practice in spite of Dr. Keiter's explicit argument that the 
practice should be categorized as his separate property. (R. 487-529, 641:710). While 
there is a finding that ''Respondent did not stipulate that the medical practice was marital" 
(R. 509), the trial court should also have entered a finding that Dr. Keiter's medical 
practice was his separate property. The requirement under Elman to categorize property 
as separate or marital is not eliminated merely because the parties stipulated to a 
particular division of the medical practice profits upon the occurrence of certain future 
conditions such as retirement or sale after the payment of legitimate debt. 
The classification of Dr. Keiter's medical practice as separate property is highly 
significant as explained later in this brief. If Dr. Keiter owns the practice separately, then 
any payments from his medical practice bank account toward the Snow Basin Property 
are not a type of commingling. Dr. Keiter would also be entitled to the contents of his 
defined benefit plan, which purchased the Snow Basin Property in 1981 (R. 491). 
Furthermore, unlike in Oliekan, a remand on the issue of the characteristic of Dr. Keiter's 
Because Dr. Keiter's medical practice was and is his separate property, then his medical 
practice bank account is also necessarily his separate property. 
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medical practice would not waste judicial resources because a remand is already needed 
to properly distribute the Snow Basin Property. 
This case is unique because the parties did not stipulate that the medical practice 
was marital; they stipulated only as to how the liquidated assets of the medical practice, if 
any, should be divided. (R. 509). Indeed, the trial court found that Dr. Keiter started his 
medical practice in 1974, seven years before the parties married. (R. 488). This fact alone 
is enough to establish a presumption that the practice was and is premarital and thus 
separate. In failing to determine that Dr. Keiter's medical practice is Dr. Keiter's separate 
property, the trial court erred as a matter of law. 
A. Dr. Keiter's medical practice was not enhanced in any way by Ms. 
Keiter nor was the practice commingled in the marital estate 
To overturn the presumption that Dr. Keiter's medical practice was and is his 
separate property, Ms. Keiter has the burden of proving that she helped to maintain or 
grow the practice. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,120, 147 P.3d 464. Such a 
contribution requires more than token involvement. In fact, even a spouse who is 
formally named as owner of a company or business does not receive any type of 
ownership interest in that property at the time of divorce if she is not involved in daily 
business operations. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,^41, 176 P.3d 476 
(accepting the trial court's finding "that Wife had only 'token involvement' in [husband's 
car dealership]"). 
The overwhelming evidence demonstrated that Ms. Keiter did not contribute to the 
maintenance or growth of the medical practice. (R. 640: 377, 423). While she received an 
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"officer's salary" in the form of biweekly deposits into her personal account, the money 
did not represent earnings from her contributions to the practice; it was provided by Dr. 
Keiter to cover food and basic household needs. (R. 502). Ms. Keiter rarely went to the 
office. (R. 640:426). She did not fill the role of secretary, interior designer, or 
bookkeeper. (R. 639:150-153). Although there were a few occasions during the marriage 
on which Ms. Keiter provided emergency services for the practice, such were few and she 
was adequately paid for any work she performed. (R. 640:421, 426). 
Alternatively, Ms. Keiter could overturn the presumption that Dr. Keiter's medical 
practice is separate property by showing that the practice was commingled in and became 
part of the marital estate so that its separate identity was lost. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, 
f 20, 147 P.3d 464. But such is not the case with Dr. Keiter's medical practice. 
Since his first day of practice, Dr. Keiter has maintained a separate account for his 
medical practice and a separate personal bank account. (R. 493, 501-02). The only 
income that was distributed to Ms. Keiter from the medical practice was the monthly sum 
of $620, which Ms. Keiter kept in her separate personal account. (R. 502). Even so, all 
payments to support and improve the medical practice came from Dr. Keiter's separate 
accounts. (R. 639:147-49). No marital funds were applied to the practice because the 
parties each maintained separate accounts during the entire course of the marriage. (R. 
502). 
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B. The parties' stipulation to equally divide any assets from the medical 
practice does not change the nature of the practice from separate 
property to marital property 
There is no case law to support the conclusion that a stipulation as to the division 
of marital property upon the occurrence of certain future conditions determines the 
character of that property. Furthermore, courts are not bound by party stipulations when 
making property distributions, even if such an agreement was previously approved by the 
court. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(awarding wife all net proceeds from sale of marital home in spite of fact that parties had 
agreed to temporarily split the net proceeds equally). This latitude in making property 
distributions only heightens the need for courts to adhere to the requirement of first 
classifying property before making any property distribution. Thus, a finding should be 
entered that Dr. Keiter's medical practice was and is his separate property. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE SNOW BASIN PROPERTY IS MARITAL PROPERTY TO 
BE DIVIDED EQUALLY 
Utah law has long held that anything a person acquires before marriage is separate 
property. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In order for 
separate property to lose its identity and become marital property, there needs to be a 
preponderance of evidence of either enhancement or commingling. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 
2006 UT App 405, \ 20, 147 P.3d 464. When the trial court concluded that the Snow 
Basin Property was marital property that should be divided equally between Dr. and Ms. 
Keiter but failed to support this conclusion with sufficiently detailed findings, it abused 
its discretion. 
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A. The Snow Basin Property was acquired by Dr. Keiter before the 
marriage and retained its separate character when it was distributed 
to Dr. Keiter individually from his defined benefit retirement plan 
Separate property includes premarital assets, inheritances, or individual gifts. See 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, % 13, 176 P3d 476 (quoting Olsen v. 
Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, f 23, 169 P.3d 765). "The general rule is that equity requires 
that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including 
any appreciation of the separate property." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). The fact that separate property is converted or distributed for investment 
purposes does not change its separate nature or constitute commingling. 
Conversion from one investment medium to another does not, by itself 
destroy the integrity of segregation. . . . In order to preserve the property's 
separate character, the donee or heir would be required to maintain the 
property in the same physical form in which it was received, be it 
securities, real estate, or cash. The law does not require such economic 
absurdity. 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that even though a 
spouse's separate property changed forms, the wife maintained its separate character 
through "segregated accounts and portfolios and the home she purchased."). 
In this case, it is clear that Dr. Keiter acquired the Snow Basin Property in 1981, 
prior to his marriage to Ms. Keiter. (R. 491). The property was originally held by Dr. 
Keiter's separate defined benefit plan, in which Ms. Keiter was never a participant. (R. 
491, 500). The trial court seemingly acknowledged that the Snow Basin Property was 
separate property prior to 1994 because it found that "jwjhen this Snow Basin property 
came out of the defined benefit plan, even though it was to respondent's name, it lost its 
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separate character entirely." (R. 514-15). You cannot lose what you never had; so prior to 
1994, the Snow Basin Property was clearly Dr. Keiter's separate property. The trial court 
should have included a finding and conclusion to that effect. Thus, the trial court erred by 
not concluding that the Snow Basin Property was and is Dr. Keiter's separate and 
premarital property. 
In 1994, all of the assets in Dr. Keiter's defined benefit plan except for the Snow 
Basin Property were rolled over into his profit sharing plan. The Snow Basin Property 
was distributed to Dr. Keiter individually. (R. 499-500). Despite this fact, the trial court 
found that the Snow Basin Property lost its separate character entirely when it came out 
of the defined benefit plan and was distributed to Dr. Keiter individually. (R. 493, 514-
15). No case law supports such an inference or conclusion; furthermore, the court failed 
to explain how the above transaction caused the Snow Basin Property to lose its separate 
character. 
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. The findings of fact 
must show that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and 
is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, \ 16, 176 P.3d 476 (quoting 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)). In this case, the trial court failed 
to disclose the steps supporting or leading to its conclusion that the Snow Basin Property 
became marital. 
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The trial court found that the Snow Basin Property lost its separate character 
through commingling, but the findings failed to detail how and why this change took 
place. According to Burt, the Snow Basin Property could appropriately be transferred out 
of Dr. Keiter's defined benefit plan without losing its separate character. The fact that the 
property was transferred to Dr. Keiter as an individual during the parties' marriage is 
likewise insufficient to support a change in the property's separate character. See Johnson 
v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329, U 9, 2007 WL 2965127 (affirming that the wife's 
separately held property, even though acquired during the marriage, was not part of the 
marital estate). The evidence on which the trial court based its finding of commingling is 
that the parties "discussed" the property and that marital funds were applied to the 
property. (R. 515). This is a mischaracterization and is not enough. 
It is undisputed that Dr. Keiter purchased and made the large majority of payments 
on the Snow Basin Property before his marriage to Ms. Keiter. (R. 491, 639:189). 
Additionally, all payments of taxes, improvements, etc. came from Dr. Keiter's separate 
accounts. (R. 501, 508). Furthermore, the Snow Basin Property did not lose its separate 
identity when it was transferred to Dr. Keiter individually. Thus, there is not only a 
logical but also a legal gap in the trial court's conclusion which necessarily calls for 
correction. 
The property was distributed to Dr. Keiter individually. The law allows for 
married couples to receive inheritances and gifts as separate property, and this situation is 
no different. To somehow conclude that the Snow Basin Property became marital 
property to which Ms. Keiter has claim "would virtually eliminate the ability of a party to 
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acquire separate property during the marriage [and] . . . would be inharmonious with 'the 
rights that married persons have always had in this state to separately own and enjoy 
property.'" Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329, % 9, 2007 WL 2965127 (quoting 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)). The property was merely 
transferred from Dr. Keiter's separate retirement plan to him as an individual. This 
transfer was done as a result of legal advice and for investment purposes. 
B. Because the evidence shows that the Snow Basin Property was 
acquired by Dr. Keiter before the marriage, the burden of proof 
shifted to Ms. Keiter to show that the property became marital, 
which she did not meet 
The Snow Basin Property was Dr. Keiter's separate property both prior to and 
after distribution to Dr. Keiter as an individual. Accordingly, the burden shifted to Ms. 
Keiter to prove that the Snow Basin Property became marital. See Bradford v. Bradford, 
1999 UT App 373, \ 23, 993 P.2d 887 (outlining what a spouse must prove to counter a 
finding of separate property). The only time separate property becomes marital is if 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring 
an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring 
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse. 
Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^  20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)). Thus, if the Snow Basin Property was at one 
time Dr. Keiter's separate property, which the trial court implies was the case, then the 
law requires some event of commingling or enhancement which would change the nature 
of the Snow Basin Property to a marital asset. 
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L The Snow Basin Property was not enhanced by Ms. Keiter and, 
therefore^ retained its separate character 
To find that premarital property has become marital requires something more than 
that a spouse simply maintained the household while the other spouse worked. See Jensen 
v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, \ 14, 203 P.3d 1020 (noting that the activities of homemaking 
and caretaking are not enough "to justify an award of Husband's separate property."); 
Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ^  19 190 P.3d 497 (holding that wife's domestic 
labors, such as laundering clothes, were "insufficient to support a factual finding of either 
commingling or enhancement of the Properties."). In Kunzler, a case where a wife sought 
a one-half interest in real property belonging to the husband, the Utah Court of Appeals 
distinguished activities such as bookkeeping, secretarial services, and construction 
management (which are forms of enhancement) from the basic role of homemaking 
(which is not enhancement). The law requires an active participation and direct 
contribution or sacrifice from the non-owning spouse, which helps a business or property 
to grow, in order to award the non-owning spouse an interest in that separate property. 
Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, f 14, 203 P.3d 1020. 
In this case, Ms. Keiter had little to no involvement with the Snow Basin Property. 
Although she claims to have visited the property a few times with Dr. Keiter, the record 
shows that she was less than enthusiastic about the property and its potential during the 
entire course of the marriage. (R. 640:454-55; R. 508). While it would be feasible to 
award Ms. Keiter some type of interest in the Snow Basin Property if she had overseen 
improvements to the land, if she had helped arrange for construction, or if marital funds 
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were used to pay taxes and other associated expenses, none of these scenarios exist. (R. 
640:458-59). In fact, the Snow Basin Property has been only modestly improved since 
1981. (R. 508). 
2. The Snow Basin Property's character was not changed through 
commingling 
Separate property becomes marital property if there is commingling and 
exchanges such that "the property has been consumed or its identity lost[.]" Johnson v. 
Johnson, 2007 UT App 329, % 7, 2007 WL 2965127 (quoting Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 
UT App 405, ^  20, 147 P.3d 464). If marital funds are applied to a piece of real estate, 
there may be sufficient commingling to warrant a finding that the property is marital. See 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding "no error 
in the court's determination that the appreciated portion of the asset changed its character 
from a personal asset to a marital asset. . . [and] that Wife was entitled to one-half of the 
appreciation of the building.") (emphasis added). But commingling does not occur 
simply because a premarital asset is converted, cashed out, or rolled over. See Oliekan v. 
Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,121, 147 P.3d 464 (rejecting wife's argument that husband's 
retirement plan "lost its separate identity when it was rolled over"). 
The basis on which the trial court found that the Snow Basin Property became 
marital property is through commingling. (R. 514-15). Dr. Keiter challenges the trial 
court's finding that the Snow Basin Property is marital as a result of commingling. In so 
doing, Dr. Keiter marshals the evidence in support of the court's finding, which is cited 
below. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, \ 9, 176 P.3d 476 (explaining 
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husband's obligation to "marshal the evidence in support of the [trial court's] findings" 
before "demonstrating] that the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence" 
(quoting Feather stone v. Industrial Commission, 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994))). 
The trial court found that somehow when the nature of Dr. Keiter's retirement plan 
was changed and the property distributed to Dr. Keiter individually, that the property lost 
its separate character. (R. 514-15). The facts supporting this finding are that the Snow 
Basin Property was distributed out of the defined benefit plan during the marriage, that 
the parties "discussed" the property, that the titling of the Snow Basin Property in Dr. 
Keiter's name was a tax strategy, and that marital funds were used to pay for and improve 
the property (because the Court determined that Dr. Keiter's housed marital funds in his 
personal accounts). (R. 493, 504, 514-15). This is a flawed and an incorrect finding, 
which no case law supports. 
In contrast, the substantial evidence shows that Dr. Keiter, as trustee of his profit 
sharing plan purchased the Snow Basin Property in 1981—before he married Ms. Keiter. 
(R. 491). Ms. Keiter was never a named participant in the profit sharing plan. (R. 500). In 
1994, the Snow Basin Property was distributed to Dr. Keiter individually when his 
defined benefit plan was changed to a profit sharing plan. (R. 499-500). Any payments, 
property taxes, and improvements made on the Snow Basin Property were funded 
exclusively through Dr. Keiter's personal medical practice account or retirement account, 
not Ms. Keiter's account. (R. 496, 501, 508). There were only two documented post-
marriage payments made on or connected to the Snow Basin Property. (R. 496). One 
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payment was from Dr. Keiter's personal account and the other was from Dr. Keiter5 s 
medical practice account. (R. 496). Dr. Keiter brought these accounts into the marriage as 
his separate property and maintained them as his separate property during the marriage. 
(R. 493). Ms. Keiter did not have signatory authority on either account nor did she make 
any deposits into these accounts. (R. 639:148, 640:434). Thus, there was no 
commingling. Yet, the trial court erroneously determined that Dr. Keiter's personal 
account housed marital funds, thereby supporting its argument that the Snow Basin 
property became marital when Dr. Keiter made payments toward the Snow Basin 
Property from that personal account. (R. 504). 
The evidence also conclusively shows that Ms. Keiter never made any payments 
from her personal account toward the purchase, maintenance, improvement, or protection 
of the Snow Basin Property. (R. 496, 508). Also, to the extent that Dr. Keiter's medical 
practice funded any portion of the taxes on or improvements to the Snow Basin Property, 
it has already been extensively argued previously in this brief that Dr. Keiter's medical 
practice was and is his separate property. See supra Part I. The Snow Basin Property has 
not been developed. (R. 488b). While the land has been modestly improved, all 
improvements have come from Dr. Keiter's personal accounts. (R. 508). 
While the parties may have "discussed" the Snow Basin Property, this fact alone 
does not support an argument for commingling. (R. 515). At no time during the parties' 
marriage did Dr. Keiter add Ms. Keiter to the title of the Snow Basin Property, even 
though he had many opportunities to make a change, if desired. (R. 500). The trial court 
found that the titling of the Snow Basin Property was done "solely for tax purposes." (R. 
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515). Taking this fact as true, it makes no difference in the character of the Snow Basin 
Property because it does not prove the commingling or enhancement necessary to divest 
the property of its identity as separate property. 
In sum, the Snow Basin Property remained clearly identifiable when it was 
transferred out of the defined benefit plan. In other words, it was not lost in the abyss of 
the marital estate; as a piece of real estate, it has remained clearly identifiable and can be 
segregated without speculation or guesswork. 
C. Equity does not demand that Ms. Keiter be awarded any interest in 
the Snow Basin Property 
Courts have discretion to award the separate property of one spouse to the other 
spouse but only "in 'extraordinary situations where equity so demands.'55 Elman v. 
Elrnan, 2002 UT App 83, t 19, 45 P.3d 176 (quoting Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304, 308 (Utah 1988). If there has been no commingling or enhancement of separate 
property, such property can be awarded to the non-owning spouse only if the spouse 
laying claim to the separate property makes an acceptable and compelling equitable 
argument. See Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, % 20 190 P.3d 497 (reversing the 
trial court's award to wife of one-half of husband's undivided interests in real property 
because "[w]ife never presented, either at trial or on appeal, an equity-based argument to 
suggest that awarding an interest in the Properties would be appropriate.55). Because 
awarding separate property to a non-owning spouse goes directly against the presumptive 
rule of property distribution, a court making such a deviation must set forth an "equitable 
rationale55 in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 
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2008 UT App 11, % 22, 176 P.3d 476. See also Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App 394, f 5, 
174 P.3d 1137 (stating that a court must ufind[] and articulate[] 'exceptional 
circumstances' warranting such a departure."). 
The extraordinary circumstances in which separate property should be awarded to 
the non-owning spouse are limited. See e.g., Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, f 35, 
147 P.3d 464 (awarding wife half of husband's deferred compensation plan, even though 
the asset was frozen prior to the parties' marriage, because of the wife's efforts, which 
enabled the husband to retire early); Schanmberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (noting that a court may award separate property "in lieu of alimony"). There 
is no case law describing extraordinary circumstances as including a long-term marriage, 
a disparity in earning potential, or the fact that one spouse owns more "separate" property 
than the other. In fact, such situations are not extraordinary but are instead commonplace. 
In this case, the trial court did not find any extraordinary circumstances justifying 
the award of Dr. Keiter's separate property to Ms. Keiter. (R. 487-523). Nor was there 
memorialized in the findings and conclusions an equitable rationale that would support 
awarding Ms. Keiter any part of the Snow Basin Property. (R. 487-529). 
Even in reevaluating the facts, one realizes that there is no good reason to give the 
Snow Basin Property, which was and is Dr. Keiter's separate property, to Ms. Keiter. 
First, Ms. Keiter has not expended great effort or made unusual sacrifices to develop and 
increase the value of the Snow Basin Property. (R. 640:458-59). In fact, very little was 
done to improve the property during the marriage. (R. 508, 538). And any improvement 
can be attributed to Dr. Keiter. (R. 508). Second, the trial court was not dealing with a 
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situation in which a spouse owes but cannot afford to pay alimony. The Keiters enjoyed a 
bounteous marital estate, even without the inclusion of the Snow Basin Property's 
appraised value. (R. 488b). And Dr. Keiter, as a plastic surgeon, has the income to meet 
any alimony obligation the trial court chose to award. (R. 488). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions Law 
and Decree of Divorce because the trial court did not divide the marital estate as required 
by law. The trial court made several critical errors which include not characterizing Dr. 
Keiter's medical practice as separate property and finding that the Snow Basin Property 
became marital without the necessary evidence to support such a conclusion. Short of 
defining it in a pre- or post-nuptial agreement, Dr. Keiter did everything possible to keep 
the Snow Basin Property as his sole and separate property. Even so, the trial court 
concluded that the property became marital and subject to equal distribution. These errors 
produced an inequitable and unlawful property distribution, which amounts to a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
Dated this •£' day of May 2009. 
CLYD&S$jfW & SESSIONS/y 
Cl^ARK W. SESSIONS 
LEE A. KILLIAN 
SARAH L. CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
John Edward Keiter 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May 2009, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed via first-class U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid to: 
Frederick N. Green 
7390 South Creek Road, Suite 104 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
29 
